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BOOK REVIEWS
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION. By James B. White.' Boston, Massachusetts:
Little, Brown & Co. 1973. Pp. xxxv, 986. $18.50.
2
Reviewed by Kenneth Vinson

If you wish to study law and literature, legal process, legal writing,
statutory interpretation or jurisprudence, you could do worse than
James White's The Legal Imagination. If you desire all those things
rolled up into one textbook, White's unique Imagination is your only
option. But White's and Little, Brown's big yellow book, which is
harder to describe than obscenity, is, strictly speaking, about none of
those traditional law school subjects. In a way White, who practiced
law and now teaches, is asking how a human being can become a lawyer
without becoming a bloodless, legalistic, have-gun-will-travel son of a
bitch-except Imagination puts the question more gently.
Imagination joins a multitude of writings in the law school library
urging humanism in the law. The book's uniqueness derives from
White's background in literature and literary criticism, out of which
he defines "a point of view from which to regard the law. One might
even say that this course is an attempt to connect different sides of my
own intellectual life, a response to the feeling that the life of the
lawyer is somehow set off from all other experience" (p. 967).
Despite the intelligence and humaneness that White has poured
into his "reading and writing" book, its poems and literary critiques
lack the punch necessary to unlock the LSAT-certified brains that
have been programed by doctors of jurisprudence to receive the black
letters. White's is a nice, friendly book for nice, friendly sisters- and
brothers-in-The-Law who would cure the law schools' irrelevance by
singing psalms in the temple while the moneychangers work on.
A tougher and more direct critic of legal education, Ralph Nader,
urges that law schools repent and throw the moneychangers out, that
for too long law schools have modeled themselves on Harvard Law
School's "brilliant myopia," engineering students into "corridor thinking and largely non-normative evaluation." This "three-year excursus
through legal minutiae," says Nader, goes hand in hand with the "escape from responsibility for the quality and quantity of justice in the
relationships of men and institutions [which] has been a touchstone
of the legal profession." 3 Nader would clean house; White would add
Great Books to the law library.
1. Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
2. Professor of Law, Florida State University.
3. Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, THE NEw REPUBLIC, October 11, 1969, at 20.
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Some students, by working through Imagination'swanderings, may
find a personal antidote to the trade school curriculum's overdose of
commercial lawyering. I hope so; I have been told by a humanist who
slaughters squirrels that there are several ways to skin a squirrel. Yet
too often for my taste White is the apologist for legalism, as when he
says "one simply cannot write rules in ordinary English" (p. 231). It's
nonsense, claims White in a section on "Is the Judge Really a Poet?,"
to think of a judge deciding the way (s)he wants to, and then after4
wards dressing up the opinion in legal language.
If I had to label White's collection of legal and literary writings,
I would call it jurisprudence-a theory of inquiry. White's principal
inquiry is how various language systems encompass or filter out the
world of feeling, thought and judgment. Must the legal word a prison
make? Can a lawyer live and breathe multiple whereases, reasonably
prudent persons, nolo contenderes and covenants running upstream,
and stay alive and attuned to something grander than "brilliant
myopia"?
Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Bentham, Plato, Lincoln, Keats, Austin,
Frank, Hart, Warren, Donne and Burger are just a few of Imagination's contributors. In White's personal comments and questions, he
suggests that, not only are you what you eat, you are also what you
talk and write. 5 I'm reminded of that unfeeling social worker in A
Thousand Clowns who was so defined, enslaved and dehumanized by
his professional jargon. The analogous lawyer would be somebody so
smothered by the law's stuffy pile of vacuous words that her (his)
range of emotional responses is reduced to the Restatement view. A
lawyer writing in Juris Doctor talks about getting away from it all
"to recapture the headiness of not speaking legalese. ' ' 6 In law school,
what with a jealous mistress and all, I suspect many Eagle Scouts and
Christian athletes learn to drink on their way to the Bar.
White suggests that the student hang on to her (his) creativity
and individuality by artistically controlling legal language, "just as
the sculptor does with clay and marble. You may feel that you are
constrained by your material, as indeed you are. But compare the
pianist, who is told what notes to play, in what order, how long and
how loud; yet art is surely possible there" (p. xxxv). Imagination has
much talk of clay, legal craftsmanship and piano players, so much so
that I was driven to the television somewhat short of page 986.7 There's
4. J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 775 n.3 (1973).
5. Id. at 40.
6. Greenberg, Memoirs of a Quiet Crusader, JURIS DocToR, October 1974, at 28.
7. For an excellent review of The Legal Imagination by someone who may have
read to page 986, and who, although mildly critical of the book and skeptical of its
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nothing wrong with "clay and marble," but I doubt that many Florida
State University Law students, except for that handful of legal dissidents and junior bar hippies who attend jurisprudence and law-andliterature seminars, will respond to White's "sculptor." We law types
generally prefer crossword puzzles and veer offenses to Picasso and
augmented eighths. We are mainly thinking, not feeling, intuitive
types. We remember details, and can be terribly logical. We crave
order and security. We score well on the LSAT, which means we can
score well on first year law exams, which means something the exact
nature of which is uncertain. (We do know, according to the uncommon law, that a legal mind is one that can look at an object connected to something else without thinking about the something else
to which the object is attached.)
Here is part of White's "Introduction to Your Literary Circumstances." What do you think?
But part of any art is knowing one's materials well, and in this
chapter we shall begin to examine the legal language system as it
exists, as it comes down to you, made by others for your use. It is
the stuff upon which you will work as a lawyer and writer, it is
your marble and canvas .... The nature of your inherited language
shapes your task as a writer much as marble or steel shapes that of
the sculptor-perhaps even more, since you cannot choose (as he
can) among various materials, and since the language imposed upon
you has, beyond its inherent limitations, the quality of defining
the habitual expectations, the cast of mind, of the audience with
which you will necessarily deal. How are you to come to understand
this language that is given you, its secret failings and capacities?
How are you to master it, or remake it for the future? What success
can you fashion for yourself, as a lawyer and a writer? [P. 81-82.]
Another book that could help law students resist dehumanization
is Bishin and Stone's Law, Language and Ethics, a mix of philosophical
and legal writings. But students I know who've read Law, Language
and Ethics still prefer playing poker with an M.D. to dissecting Plato
with a Ph.D.
As a student my favorite law teacher was Leon Green. He has a
special magic for breathing life into the legal process. At the University
of Texas in the 1950's Dean Green stripped away the black letters so
even we silent generation people could see what goes on. Torts, we
learned, is no fictional body of rules; it is a process through which
women and men exercise government power by making human choices.
value for law students, offers, for the benefit of law professor readers, a closer look at
parts of the book, see White, Book Review, 60 VA. L. REv. 374 (1974).
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These choices come from all that stuff of life, including the law, that
tugs on human consciences." "Proximate cause" became that "skin of a
living thought."
But Dean Green is like Professor White: both are legal gentlemen,
and both speak softly in the temple of the law. Perhaps they have a
sort of faith ("the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of
things not seen") that the bench and the bar will in the end do good.
Maybe they remember too fondly a century ago when more lawyers
took seriously their duty to protect the public interest. The bar called
its members to private and public service. Establishment lawyers like
Brandeis catered to a wider constituency than the dollar bill. Superlawyer was not always a dirty word.
The Yale Law School once aimed at developing superlawyers to do
super good. Justice William 0. Douglas, along with Leon Green,
taught at Yale in the late twenties and early thirties when that faculty
of legal realists decided it was foolish for the legally learned to continue
running the country's institutions by looking (with "detached objectivity") always backward as they step blindly forward.9 They set
out to train human beings to humanely develop a policy-oriented jurisprudence.
Now, forty years later, while Professor White exudes faith, hope
and poetry, Douglas throws acid: "My years at Yale disillusioned me
concerning the law as an instrument of power for the social good." 10
Douglas remembers he "was, in a way, sorry [he] had turned to law."'"
I suspect Justice Douglas qualified his "sorry" with "in a way" because he knows that wherever he had turned in twentieth century
America he would have been a grumbler. (Personally, I'm a believer
in selective bitching. My wife goes too far in alleging that I'm a quasinag at bridge, tennis, parties, housekeeping and child rearing. As far
as the law is concerned, I believe with Justice Douglas it is far better
to have bitched and lost, than never to have bitched at all.)
Douglas gloomily recalls the predatory qualities required for
practicing law on behalf of the predatory men of finance. The big
names in law "were, with few exceptions, attached to men who exploited the system but brought very few spiritual or ethical values to
it .... (T)hey were mostly shriveled men with no interests beyond the
law."' 2
8. See Vinson, Torts in a Devil's Nutshell, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 430 (1969).
9. Douglas, When Justice Douglas Taught at Yale, YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, October
1974, at 44.
10. Id. at 45.
11. Id. at 44.
12. Id.

1974]

BOOK REVIEWS

Looking to the law schools, Douglas blasts the "heavy-footed traditionalists" for training mechanics to memorize rules and manipulate
them like a deck of cards, without concern for who gets a raw deal.
The Yale faculty failed, says Douglas, to make the law school a part
of life and of the University; despite some interdisciplinary beginnings,
pressure from the bar and alumni eventually pushed the law school
into its traditional insulated compartment. 3
Were it not for educators like White, Bishin, Stone and Green,
and a few recalcitrant students, law school would be one giant Hornbook, authored by the Institute for the Legally Elite, manufactured in
Detroit by Nitty Gritty, Ennui & Co., on a loan by Nelson Rockefeller's
brother which Nelson Rockefeller knows nothing about. Professor
Paul Savoy, in his recent article Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, sounds like Justice Douglas when he says: "Teaching how to
'think like a lawyer' . . . [is] but a process of socialization enforced by
putting students through some form of suffering and aimed at the
production of reliable and predictable people who will be readily
assimilated into the Bar Association." '14 Savoy says that many bright
young people consider law school a place "where old men in their
twenties go to die"-the deep-freeze of the emotional life of the university. 15 Lawyers and law students, Savoy says, resist attempts to get in
touch with their feelings: "We are desperately in need of room for
feeling not only in the development of the law, but in the process of
learning law as well. We need what Abraham Maslow calls a 'healthy
irrationality' with which to move beyond the limitations of purely
' 16
abstract and logical modes of thought."
In his New Politics, Savoy describes his efforts at teaching in a new,
humane way. I understand, however, that Savoy has left law teaching.
So, by the way, has Yale's Charles Reich, who before The Greening of
America, wrote Toward the Humanistic Study of Law.'7 Reich has
gone to live in San Francisco. Law schools dislike "healthy irrationality"
or any other alien influence. Calls for humanistic and interdisciplinary
law studies get a better hearing in undergraduate legal studies departments. When the sterile black letters and the "detached objectivity"
of our fictional rule of law drive students to more drink, faculties
pacify the malcontents with more clinical courses (and demand larger
salaries and greater isolation from the university so that more nitty
gritty can be stuffed into "tomorrow's leaders"). Savoy refers to a law
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 45.
Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 Y.L L.J. 444, 460 (1970).
Id. at 462.
Id. at 466.
Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965).
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student's thought that "law school teaches students to deal with every
conceivable loss, that of an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife-every one,
that is, but the most important, the loss of one's self ....."18 Savoy

wonders whether there can be any real innovation in legal education
in the next 25 years.
On the Law's Dark Side.-Real innovation at the Ole Miss law
school was attempted in the 1960's. It failed. I was a part of the Ole
Miss faculty that coaxed the Ford Foundation into putting half a
million dollars into the law school. Dean Joshua Morse told Ford: "This
law school can be tremendously influential ....Many of the problems
which plague [Mississippi] stem from a provincial outlook. Our students are accustomed to examining every question in light of its impact on Mississippi culture rather than taking a broader view." 19
With Ford funds Morse hired Yale-trained instructors, and created
a new willingness to listen to outside opinions. Even integrator Bobby
Kennedy spoke at the law school, as did black leaders Aaron Henry,
Charles Evers and Fannie Lou Hamer.
Thirty law professors from Harvard, Yale, Columbia and NYU
spent two weeks each on the Ole Miss campus lecturing on constitutional law and the nature of justice. The students responded well to
new courses on political and civil rights, legal services for the indigent,
student rights, social legislation, and international law.
Yale's Dean Louis H. Pollak, one of the visiting law faculty, said
that the Ole Miss law school "is at the threshold of becoming a focus
for the kind of thinking that can bring Mississippi into the 20th century."2 0 Time praised the law school's new look.

Federal and private grants were awarded to the law school to
establish public defender and legal services programs. Proportionately
more blacks attended the Ole Miss law school than any other "white"
law school in the United States; two black graduates ran for city
offices in Jackson. Ebony featured the law school-and Mississippi
lawyer M.M. Roberts told his fellow trustees on the segregationist college board he was 'embarrassed by my law school." 21
The North Mississippi OEO Legal Services Program, funded
through and operated by the law school, filed a school desegregation
suit in Holly Springs (which the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit decided in favor of the indigent black plaintiffs). The
conservative state bar association, the college board and the legislature
18.
cember
19.
20.
21.

Savoy, supra note 14, at 502. See also With the Editors, 84 HARv. L. REv., De1970, at vii.
Vinson, The Lawyers of Ole Miss, 208 THE NATION 791 (1969).
Id.
Id.
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(packed with old Ole Miss law graduates), shocked at this betrayal
from within, turned on this alien law school.
The Mississippi state bar worked hard to kill the law school's legal
services program. Bar commissioners passed rules saying in effect that
unless OEO legal service programs are controlled by local lawyers, the
legal services lawyers may be penalized. The bar and legislature eventally pressured and forced legal services out of the law school. Dissenting law teachers were denied a general university raise. Out-of-state
faculty recruiting was curtailed. The alien faculty left and the law
school's new look reverted to the "detached objectivity" of the rule
of Mississippi law.
Legal history names many humane lawyers and legal deeds. Some
of my best friends have LL.B.'s. Ten years ago, those marchers and
sitters-in who worked to overcome the South's official racism turned
for help to legalism, and a few sympathetic federal judges helped crack
open the closed society. Most of the Florida State University law
faculty publicly opposed Harrold Carswell's nomination to the Supreme
Court. Many of the free speech decisions of late have helped slow the
process of molding plastic people who will elect plastic presidents.
Some dissidents who, loving America on weekends and in odd years,
22
wish neither to leave it nor to burn it, look to the law for salvation.
They see Justice Douglas still holding Court against plastic modernity
and somehow conclude the long arm of the law can be used to rid
America of corporate, political, educational and environmental pollution.
I would like to believe that. Yet my skepticism about the world of
lawyers and their magic prompts this caution about the dark side of
the law. As the eleventh chapter of Luke makes clear, legal types have
long been suspect: "Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away
the key of knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that
were entering in ye hindered." The revolutionary jurisprudence of
Shakespeare's King Henry VI was: "The first thing we do, let's kill
all the lawyers." Nonbelievers in the law have probably existed ever
since lawyers put on robes and wigs, or whatever they first put on to
improve the image. The public today is still ambivalent about lawyers.
Ignorance of the law, by breeding fear and uncertainty, fosters respect.
On the other hand, the respectful layman knows to keep hand firmly
pressed against wallet when near a law office.
Of course, the legally hopeful can point to current legal niceties like
the young public interest lawyers; to judicial humanists like Douglas
22. See Levinson, The Rediscovery of Law, 57
Vinson, The Rediscovery of Law: A Response, 57
have drawn in writing this review.

SOUNDINGS
SOUNDINGS

318, 319 (1974). See also
338 (1974), from which I
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and J. Skelly Wright; to lawyer statesmen like Nader and William
Kunstler and Ramsey Clark; to square shooters like John Sirica; and,
scattered here there around the land, to lawyers who take seriously
their responsibility to do public good.
But these are legal aberrations. The legally learned today practice
the same sort of word-magic, usually in support of the same fat-cats
and kings, that they did 4000 years ago when they were called priests.
"It is lawyers," wrote recently retired Yale law professor Fred Rodell,
"who run our civilization for us-our governments, our business, our
' '2 3
private lives.
The law, since lawyers own it, is a reluctant progressive. Lawyers
are too well paid to manage wealth and power any way but conservatively. Each year a few more law students conclude that their training is
morally and intellectually bankrupt, although most law students so
succumb to the law schools' brainwashing that they never realize that
the vague abstract principles they learn to mouth are not external
verities but stuff and nonsense. "[I]t would be fatal," says Rodell, "to
the profession-to its self-respect and its solemnity and its power-if
any generation of rising lawyers were allowed or encouraged to discover
the real truth about the stuff they study. ' '2 4 Learning the lawyers' talk
and the lawyers' way of thinking is very much like learning to play
bridge:
It requires concentration and memory and some analytic ability,
and for those who become proficient it can be a stimulating intellectual game. Yet those who work cryptograms or play bridge
never pretend that their mental efforts, however difficult and involved, have any significance beyond the game they are playing.
Whereas those who play the legal game not only pretend but insist that their intricate ratiocinations in the realm of pure thought
have a necessary relation to the solution of practical problems. It
is through the medium of their wierd and wordy mental gymnastics
that the lawyers lay down the rules under which we live. And it is
only because the average man cannot play their game, and so cannot see for himself how intrinsically empty-of-meaning their playthings are, that the lawyers continue to get away with it.
25
The legal trade, in short, is nothing but a high-class racket.
There may be some duplicate players who object to characterizing
bridge as an empty plaything. But what lawyer can deny the "play23.
24.
25.

F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERSl 7 (1939).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 15-16.
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thing" element in his legal jargon? I'm reminded of when I was a teenage West Texas anti-Communist. When the enemy was among us like
a fungus and we had to infiltrate the underground cells over in the
Mexican section, we patriots created a secret tongue. We spies spoke
Red by adding to every other word a vich, sky or vik. In law school it
became a quasi, res, lex, pro or mala.
For pre-law training, even better than speaking Red was learning
how the Bible clearly, logically and beyond a reasonable doubt demands total immersion and weekly communion, and forbids instrumental music in the worship service (all proved by a legal reasoning
that Chief Justice John Marshall would envy-or perhaps copied into
Marbury v. Madison).
On Professor White's theory that you are what you talk, our mothers
in that Last Picture Show kind of town sent us to revival and vacation
Bible school to learn to speak Jesus. The Word, literally interpreted,
saved; learn your basic Bible and be one with Christ. In church buildings, where God personally resided, Her (His) name had four awesome
letters-Gawd. Masters of basic gospel could verbally capitalize the
pronouns, just as a master lawyer can say "May it please this HONORABLE COURT." Some Christian anti-Communists were saved two
or three times and had so much practice they could pray in public
without even having to think, like when you've forgotten the combination on a lock and you have to open it by reflex. If you could really
get right with Gawd and had the knack for it, you might speak in
tongues that only you and the Master Lawyer could comprehend.
But we tough Texans couldn't talk Gentle Jesus all the time. We
also had to learn the language of life's most important game-football.
You are what you talk: "Crack heads" (fight fiercely); "Hit him where
he lives" (insert helmet midway between eyes and ankles); "No splittails, no weeds" (no girls, no tobacco); "Let's do some popping and
show 'em who the real hosses are" (do it unto the other fellow before
he does it unto you). We gridiron Wildcats snarled, spit, pulled on
our orange and black armor, "sucked up our guts," and performed
beastly deeds, as do lawyers who grunt "nolo contendere," "executive
privilege," "depletion allowance" and "sanctity of property" by reflex.
White's book has a Mark Twain piece in which Twain looks at the
Mississippi River, first with rapture, then with a snarl. As a steamboat
passenger, Twain is overwhelmed by the beauty of the water, the trees,
the shadows, the color, the late afternoon sun. But later in life Twain
looks at the river as a professional river pilot, and can see only the
river's treachery: faint ripples means hidden rocks or wrecks, a bright
sun means wind tomorrow, a floating log shows that the river is rising,
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a slanting mark on the water refers to a bluff reef that is going to kill
somebody's steamboat. Twain says, "I had lost something which could
never be restored to me while I lived. All the grace, the beauty, the
poetry, had gone out of the majestic river" (p. 11). Too often a law
student comes to law school and loses her (his) grace, beauty and poetry.
That lawyer writing in Juris Doctor talks about how his public
interest lawyering was different:
In a crucial sense the dichotomy between "lawyer" and "human
being" is indeed greatly lessened. We do not suffer the schizoid
existence of defending industrial polluters and institutional landlords full time, while doing volunteer work one evening per week.
Or, as a friend remarked when a partner for a large Wall Street
firm tried to impress her with the fact that 10 percent of his time
was spent pro bono, "I gather then that 90 percent of your work is
pro rnala."

6

With the legal tribe in all kinds of quasi-hot water of late, now is
the time for grace and poetry. Even before Watergate's lawyer-plumbers
were flushed out, the tribe was hurting. Bar associations under antitrust fire are quietly having to burn minimum fee schedules. No-fault
auto insurance must be rammed down legal throats. Too many people
with legal headaches can afford only aspirin. The law school's threeyear curriculum includes ethics-for thirty minutes. Bar grievance
committees and judicial disqualification commissions continue to hide
their work, hoping that charges of coverup and demands for government in the sunshine will go away. A Florida Supreme Court Justice
flushes a forbidden utility company memo down the toilet, but the
memo floats back up. And Richard Nixon resigns from the California
Bar. As Clarence Darrow said, "The trouble with law is lawyers."
Most legal training ill prepares leaders to rationally shape public
policy toward the humane goals of an open society. Law schools train
in verbal manipulation and foster the notion of the law's "detached
objectivity." Yet judges must make policy choices on important social
questions. The ambiguous slogans in law books don't give much help.
Government in this country demands direction. Whether the governors
are lawyers, social scientists, engineers or philosophers, they cannot
and should not govern in "detached" darkness (although they could
and should get off private payrolls).
When New Deal legal realists like Thurman Arnold and Jerome
Frank exposed the legal power structure, they were not crying over
the loss of "detached objectivity." Those good liberals simply (and
26. Greenberg, supra note 6,at 28.
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openly) preferred the committed subjectivity of their fellow New Dealers. This was when the laissez-faire Justices on the Supreme Court
were knocking down FDR's progressive programs-in the name of
the law.
Legal realists remind us of the political power that courts exercise,
and of the gap between abstract legal formulas and decision. The gap is
filled by judicial choices. Legal realists are usually liberals who prefer
that law training be aimed toward an open society keyed to human
dignity. During the 1930's, when moss-back legalists reigned on the
Supreme Court, liberals like Arnold and Frank mixed politics and
truth by blowing the whistle on the Court's counterfeit objectivity.
Politics was too important to be left to the lawyers.
Since Chief Justice John Marshall concocted that legal fiction
about the Constitution empowering judges to veto legislatures, the
Supreme Court has generally protected vested interests. For a while,
the liberal Warren Court gave human dignity precedence over the
claims of property, but the Burger Court is already backing off. Precedent, even for Republican judges, is another legal fiction. The Burger
Court, says Eugene McCarthy, is our "worst Supreme Court."
"Nothing doth more hurt in a state than that cunning men pass
for wise." 27 Rodell describes the smart games that legal people play:
In tribal times, there were the medicine men. In the Middle Ages,
there were the priests. Today there are the lawyers. For every age, a
group of bright boys, learned in their trade and jealous of their
learning, who blend technical competence with plain and fancy
hocus-pocus to make themselves master of their fellow men. For
every age, a pseudo-intellectual authority, guarding the tricks of its
and running, after its own pattern, the
trade from the uninitiated,
28
civilization of its day.
Huckleberry Finn got a pretty good education in legal cunning
when he helped Tom Sawyer, legalist, dig under the cabin where Jim
was trapped. Huck's lay mind thought pickaxes would best do the
digging job. Learned Tom called for case knives (table knives):
It don't make no difference how foolish it is, it's the right way-and
it's the regular way. And there ain't no other way, that ever I heard
of, and I've read all the books that gives any information about
these things. They always dig out with a case-knife .... 29
27.
28.

29.

BACON'S ESSAYS AND WISDOM OF THE ANCIENTS

F.

M.

RODELL,

158 (B. Montagu ed. 1900).

supra note 23, at 7.

TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLERRY FINN

288 (Heritage Press ed. 1940).
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After hours of fruitless digging, and his blisters on fire, a light came
to Tom's legal mind; and he says to Huck, "Gimme a case-knife." Huck
explains:
He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He flung it
down, and says:
"Gimme a case-knife."
I didn't know just what to do-but then I thought. I scratched
around amongst the old tools, and got a pickax and give it to him,
and he took it and went to work, and never said a word.
He was always just that particular. Full of principle.3 0
That's what the law is full of-principle. The judges' Mickey
Mouse rationalizations, like the diplomats' empty phrases or the politicians' equivocations, are to be taken with salt. Legal talk has no
magic for ensuring that judges will govern intelligently. The public
would be better off with less magic and more information about who
their governors really are. Then maybe legal wizards would be voted
out sooner and replaced with informed, earthy decision-makers keyed
to the perspectives of a democratic society. Meanwhile, we foolishly
elect or appoint our judges on a nonpartisan platform-so strong is
our faith in the legal legend, in the magic of the holy legal word. So
far, the law is too unassailable a "truth."
The best public service that law school could provide would be
to educate the public as to how the need for lawyers' services could
be eliminated in many areas (accident suits, real estate, probate, divorce, etc.). "But why," says the smart lawyer to his in-laws "give the
show away?" The Miami Herald, commenting on the flap about
Florida State University law school's admission this fall of a released
felon, says rather than fret about one felon getting into law school,
we should find out "why so many felons have been getting out of law
schools in the past." 81
30. Id. at 291-92.
31. The Miami Herald, August 29, 1974, § A, at 6, col. 1.
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THE URBAN COMMUNITY AND ITS UNIONIZED BUREAUCRACIES:

POLITICS

IN

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT
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RELATIONS.

By

PRESSURE

Sterling

Spero' & John M. Capozzola. 2 New York, New York: Dunellen
Publishing Co. 1973. Pp. xvii, 361. $5.95 (paperbound).
Reviewed by William Fleischman
Only one decade ago there was such an explosion of activity in
public sector labor relations that there were almost no experts available for consultation and advice. Those considered "expert" were
usually persons who had read "something," speculated just a bit on
the subject or studied some narrow aspect of the problem. The literature was the newspapers.
Today we can say that, just as the 1960's ushered in the era of
the public employee, the 1970's have ushered in the era of the public
employee labor relations expert. A subject once relegated to a scant few
pages in major labor relations treatises and perhaps to a session at
the major conferences now constitutes a "field," with all the concomitant regalia. For those needing to keep abreast of these developments, their problem (which was once, "What is there to read?") is,
"Where do I start?" The reader in this position would do well if he
or she relied upon Spero and Capozzola to solve the problem. Indeed,
I urge that this book become required reading for the law practitioner
considering what new work this field may hold; the public employer
or employee uneasy or exhilarated over the coming arrangements; the
journalists facing the demanding task of interpreting events; those
members of the public wishing to become knowledgeable; the legislator
shortly to discover that his or her role in meaningful collective bargaining is most delicate; the teachers of labor relations, public administration or business administration in search of a text; and even
the judges about to be thrust into the position of interpretors of the
new Florida law.
The authors' perspective on the issue has enabled them to write
a book that will be useful to many individuals. Most current writers
on public sector bargaining confront the problem with a stance either
of cautious opposition or grudging acceptance; in sharp contrast Spero
and Capozzola assume a stance somewhere between cautious optimism
and optimism. They see opportunities; this in itself is distinctive.
This perspective of the authors, stated explicitly and implicitly
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throughout the book, arises from their backgrounds and knowledge
as students of politics in the public service field in the past. Both are
specialists in the areas of public administration and labor relations.
Thus, they neither are labor relations experts now learning what
public administration is all about, nor are they public administration
experts now learning what labor relations and collective bargaining
are all about. Armed with expertise before the fact,4 the authors
went out into the field, gathered new evidence, talked with those on
the front lines, and then wrote a book that describes, analyzes and
teaches.
Spero and Cappozzola believe that collective bargaining in the
public sector may very well have positive efficiency effects. Their discussion of the "scope of negotiation" and the merit system reveal this
perspective most explicitly. The ideas they present on these topics
are fresh-perhaps even controversial. What is most likely to be considered controversial about the book, however, is the authors' attitude
toward strikes by public employees.
According to Spero and Cappozzola, the blanket "blunderbuss"
prohibitions against public employee strikes merely perpetuate the
myth that such strikes are usually more disruptive and dangerous to
the public health, welfare and safety than are private employee strikes.
Moreover, penalties for striking have proven ineffective. The experience of New York shows that not only do strikes continue despite
such penalties, but also that there is no evidence to suggest a correlation between the penalties and the dangers presented by strikes. Perhaps most importantly, Spero and Capozzola suggest, the enactment
of these penalties tends to lead the public employer to believe that
he can avoid a serious collective bargaining effort. The employers seem
to develop the impression that victory in collective bargaining is
achieved primarily by strike avoidance-at all costs. Strikes naturally
draw the public's acute attention to everybody's dirty linen, including
the employer's, and, knowing this, the employer too often seeks any
means to settle-and perhaps even gives the store away. The authors
argue that strike alternatives-fact-finding, mediation and arbitration
-imposed as solutions to impasse tend to lull us all into a false sense
of security:
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[C]ompulsory arbitration does not deal with or remove the causes
of impasses. . . . The power contest and irresponsibility were not
eliminated but only suspended, and legally mandated peace may
well have bred further irresponsibility by having removed responsibility for reaching a mutually acceptable decision. [P. 297.]
The authors report that many experienced public employers now desire a relaxation of the strike prohibitions.
The authors' permissive attitude toward strikes does not arise
from a philosophic bias that it is unfair to prohibit public employee
strikes. Nor are they pessimists about the prospective utility of alternative procedures. Indeed, because of their incisive understanding
of collective bargaining as a political process, Spero and Capozzola
predict that the experiences of the public sector with these other procedures can be lessons for the private sector.
Here I am compelled to editorialize. Both explicit and implicit in
many past discussions of public sector labor relations has been the
assumption that a dichotomy existed between collective bargaining in
the private and the public sectors: "Whatever collective bargaining
is in the private sector, in the public sector it is, will be and must be
different." In large part this assumption can be traced to public sector
people-employers simply hoping that it won't be the same ("otherwise it might be tough"), public employees suffering from superiority
complexes ("if we continue to be treated as ordinary workmen, we
will act like them"), and, in too many cases, public administration
experts and politicians possessing very little understanding of collective bargaining. Although somewhat bemused by this, private sector
experts also have contributed to this belief with arguments such as
the following: "In the private sector both employers and unions are
checked by market pressures, while in the public sector there is no
market. Ergo, the strike weapon is inappropriate in the public sector."
The flaw in this syllogism lies in the implicit assumption that
because strikes can be analyzed as economic phenomena they therefore are economic phenomena. This flaw has been exposed by observers
who calculated the costs both to union members and employers in
specific strike situations and who discovered that by every reasonable
estimate both parties lost. For example, this country's copper industry strike in 1968 can hardly be considered a strike which someone
"won" in economic terms. That strike was A Kind of Economic Holy
War.6 Whatever it was originally, the strike became principally a
5.
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political conflict. It is fair to say, in fact, that almost all long strikes
are "holy wars." Collective bargaining is a political process, a process
requiring astute management if the strike in which all lose is to be
avoided. Experienced observers of collective bargaining therefore agree
that when impasse develops, both parties in the negotiating process
must be very careful about the way and the extent to which they "go
public." "Going public" accelerates the holy war tendency-thus, when
the holy war does develop, the experts chorus, "They're locked inl"
Sustaining the metaphor, the experts agree that settlements between
the parties are much more akin to a "treaty of peace" (p. 296) than
7
the result of a search for truth.
The relevance of this to public sector labor relations is twofold.
First, if collective bargaining in the public sector is more political
than collective bargaining in the private sector, the dangers of the
"holy war" problem will be greater in the public sector. Parenthetically,
this implies that we should view recent public sector strike experiences
as an indication of success rather than failure. Rather than ask how we
have failed, we should ask, "How is it that we have been so successful?" The point, however, is that by definition the parties in public
sector collective bargaining will have a greater tendency to "go public"
and therefore get "locked in." The market constraints presumably
operating in the private sector are absent in the public sector. It follows that strike avoidance in the public sector requires a greater degree
of political sophistication than does strike avoidance in the private
sector. But what do the experts generally say about the use of strikealternative procedures to solve impasses in the private sector? More
often than not they claim that the alternative procedures enable the
interested parties to escape their responsibility to solve the underlying
causes of the impasse. Surely this possibility must be as great in the
public sector. Spero and Capozzola conclude:
The basic problem is restoration of services without denigrating
the law; but the law, by concentrating on punishment, defeats the
prime objective of restoration.
The result [of the absolutist strike ban approach] has been
the enactment of a spate of unenforceable laws and regulations,
7. "It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system where the Government does not attempt to control the results of negotiations, cannot be equated with
an academic collective search for truth-or even with what might be thought to be
the ideal of one.... The system has not reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that
perfect understanding among people would lead to perfect agreement among them
on values." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960) (emphasis
added). See also A. Cox, LAW ANP THE NATIONAL LABOR POLIcY 80 (1960).
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which have in effect substituted incantations against evil in place
of a search for practical efforts toward solution. [P. 316.]
It is thought that the strike ban approach lets the public off the
hook; in reality, more often it simply lets the employer and the union
off the hook. The apparent need to avoid public sector strikes leads
us to believe that we can substitute "search for truth" procedures for
collective bargaining. Thus, one Florida newspaper made the following comment about a recent police strike in Baltimore (incidentally,
a strike settled-in spite of heavy legislative penalties-by a promise of
''no reprisals"): "None of these disorders should occur under Florida's
collective bargaining law, with its detailed procedures and heavy
penalties for striking.""
In Spero and Capozzola's view, however, too often the hasty retreat
to "detailed procedures" in strike avoidance simply has the effect
of turning the spotlight off the dispute: "Compulsory arbitration is basically a legal solution to a complex problem in human relations, and trying to 'legislate a bit of compulsion' is a complicated
and dangerous business" (p. 296). They conclude: "The crucial element is to avoid the events and attitudes that precipitate strikesstatutory changes are only the beginning and can only eliminate the
artificial legalisms that currently impinge on the public employment
relationships" (p. 319). The authors are optimists about the spotlight effect of collective bargaining. They can be considered to be
saying, "Look, a policy emphasis on absolutist strike avoidance can
only have the effect of burying the political conflict. For many, this
is comforting; they have failed to understand the consequences of
this position. It would be much healthier to uncover the conflict for
all to see and understand." Although many will read this as pure,
simple pro-unionism, it is not. Such a biased reading assumes that most
strikes reflect union strength and that unions generally win strikes.
These assumptions are unwarranted. A strike (like a tango) takes two
parties; just as many employers because of weakness settle rather than
face a strike, many unions strike because of weakness. The public employees' ultimate employers, the public, can develop a holy war attitude
just as easily as can the immediate employer. Organizations pressing
their luck may win a battle, but ultimately they will surely lose the
war. At that point the road back into the public's confidence will be
long and hard.
The one issue on which I would join the authors relates to a
question that is uppermost in many minds: What precisely are the
8.
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public employees' goals? Spero and Capozzola have emphasized the
popular view that the public employees seek only redress. This theory
holds, in effect, that changes in the pecuniary and nonpecuniary conditions of work for public employees have lagged behind improved
conditions and benefits for private employees. Thus, when the explosion of militancy came in the 1960's and public employees pressing
employers with the strike weapon seemed predominantly interested in
pay increases, many observers thought that the cause of the strikers'
discontent was a prior deterioration in the public employees' relative
income position. The weakness of this theory is that no one has yet
been able to uncover any significant evidence of such a lag-at least
with regard to pay increases.
Assuming that there really was a lag in the very important nonpecuniary conditions of work, there is, nevertheless, an alternative and,
in my view, more viable and predictive explanation for what has
been happening. This view emphasizes the public employees' perception that they do not need the old parity, but rather a new parity
between public expectations and benefits conferred on employees.
In the 1960's the public began looking to the school house for
solutions to all our social ills. By implication, we also expected more
of the teachers. Today we can look back and realize that we were
asking for miracles-but ask we did. The disruption of the 1960's
also put great pressure on policemen. Not only did we ask them to
handle that pressure, at the same time we demanded that they become
social scientists. And while the police officers roamed the battlefields,
hopefully armed with new techniques of psychology, group dynamics
and, of course, a greater understanding of the law, the firemen roamed
as unarmed medics.
Ultimately these new attitudes had to alert these employees to
the gap that had developed, and was continuing to grow, between
what was expected of them and their level of compensation. This
theory is inapplicable to some public employees, but for those to
whom it is appropriate it predicts continued militance until the time
that the public either lowers its expectations of public employees or
a new parity is established. Given the public belief that more should be
expected from the employee while less should be expected of the taxpayer, perhaps our only hope is that the public employees will finally
admit defeat. This theory also has implications for the view that the
alternative procedure is a search for truth. As difficult and delicate as
it may be to use fact-finding, mediation and arbitration productively
in either private or public disputes, where does the "truth" concerning
a new parity or reasonable public expectations of police officers, teachers and firemen lie?
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The authors chose to avoid discussing such theoretical questions
as the one raised above. I believe that they could, and perhaps should,

have given greater emphasis to such questions. The response to this
criticism, however, would have to be either a different or a much
longer book. But this work is lengthy, and my criticism is already
partially answered by its extensive bibliography. This is the book we
need now; it is informative, interesting and provocative. Written
particularly for those unfamiliar with public sector bargaining and
with the intent to juxtapose myth and reality, the book is a success.
It should not be ignored.

